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1INTEREST OF AMICI CURIAE
Amicus curiae Service Employees International Union (“SEIU”) is the
nation’s largest healthcare union, with more than half its 2.2 million members in
the healthcare field. SEIU supports the Patient Protection and Affordable
Healthcare Act of 2010 (“PPACA”) because it helps ensure accessible, quality
healthcare for all Americans, including SEIU members and their families.
Amicus curiae Change to Win is a federation of four labor unions – the
International Brotherhood of Teamsters, United Farm Workers of America, United
Food and Commercial Workers International Union, and SEIU – which
collectively represent 5.5 million working men and women. Change to Win is
committed to achieving affordable healthcare for all workers and their families.
The parties have consented to the filing of this brief. No counsel for a party
authored this brief in whole or in part and no person other than amici and their
counsel made a monetary contribution to its preparation or submission.
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2INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs’ lawsuit was properly dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. Should
this Court address the merits, however, it should hold that the minimum coverage
provision of the PPACA, 26 U.S.C. §5000A, is a proper exercise of Congress’
“complete and all-embracing taxing power.” Brushaber v. Union Pac. R. Co., 240
U.S. 1, 12-13 (1916). The provision simply taxes the income of individuals whose
income exceeds the income tax filing thresholds, while exempting those who
purchase health insurance coverage. The financial obligation only applies to those
with taxable income; represents no more than a small portion of any individual’s
income; is measured as a percentage of income (subject to a floor and ceiling); and
is administered through the income tax collection system. The exaction generates
substantial revenue that the government can use to address the cost of providing
healthcare for taxpayers without adequate insurance, while creating an incentive
for taxpayers to purchase affordable coverage, reducing future government costs.
In every operational aspect this is a constitutionally valid tax.
Plaintiffs nonetheless argue that the minimum coverage provision cannot be
upheld as a tax because Congress used the label “penalty,” evincing an intent to
regulate. This misconceives the proper analysis.
First, whether an exaction is a valid exercise of the taxing power turns on its
operation, not on Congress’ “intent,” motive, or choice of label. See, e.g.,
Appellate Case: 11-1973     Page: 12      Date Filed: 08/19/2011 Entry ID: 3820278
3Hampton & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928); License Tax Cases, 72 U.S.
462 (1866). Because the minimum coverage provision simply operates to tax
income, and lacks any “penalizing features” inconsistent with its characterization
as a tax, Dep’t. of Revenue of Montana v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 779 (1994),
it is within Congress’ powers of taxation – no matter what powers Congress
believed validated the provision or what label Congress used.
Second, valid taxes often have regulatory purposes. It is clearly established
law that the presence (or even predominance) of a regulatory purpose is fully
consistent with an exaction’s validity as an exercise of Congress’ taxing power.
See United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 44 (1950).
Finally, Congress has in fact used the label “penalty” before, even when all
understood the measure to be a tax. E.g., 26 U.S.C. §1(f) (labeling certain income
tax provisions “marriage penalty”).
According to Plaintiffs and those courts that have supported them, one of the
most significant pieces of legislation in the last 50 years must be overturned
entirely for want of the word “tax,” even though its substantive operations fall
entirely within congressional tax power. This kind of “magic words”
jurisprudence is not the law. Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 310
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4(1992). The courts are charged with policing (and protecting) the substance of
Congress’ authority, not invalidating legislation based on mere matters of form.
There is no serious argument that the PPACA’s minimum coverage
provision could not be accomplished through a differently labeled but
operationally indistinguishable exercise of the taxing power. See Steward Machine
Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 581 (1937) (“Steward”); and Helvering v. Davis, 301
U.S. 619, 640 (1937) (upholding similarly structured Social Security Act
provisions as exercises of taxing power and rational responses to national problems
caused by lack of unemployment and old age insurance). The exaction is thus
squarely within Congress’ authority.
The PPACA’s opponents rely on the purportedly insufficient evidence that
Congress intended that the provision be understood as an exercise of taxing
authority, but this is both wrong on the facts and not the way congressional
authority is analyzed. Congress has ample tax authority to impose an exaction on
the income of those who decline to purchase health insurance. That is all that the
PPACA does. It is beyond question that Congress intended that its enactment be
given effect. It should therefore be upheld.
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5ARGUMENT
I. The Minimum Coverage Provision Operates As An Income Tax That
Generates Revenue To Offset Healthcare Costs While Encouraging
Taxpayers To Purchase Coverage, Further Safeguarding The Treasury
The minimum coverage provision is part of a comprehensive reform
package designed to improve the nation’s health and reduce the federal deficit.
The provision requires “applicable individual[s]” to ensure that they and their
dependents have “minimum essential coverage,” or pay an assessment. 26 U.S.C.
§5000A(a)-(b).
Congress specifically noted that healthcare costs, including the costs of
caring for the uninsured, significantly burden the federal budget. See, e.g., H.R.
Rep. No. 111-443, pt. 1, at 1 (2010); id., pt. 2, at 983. The minimum coverage
provision addresses this fiscal burden by generating annual revenue of more than
$4 billion, Congressional Budget Office (“CBO”), “Payments of Penalties for
Being Uninsured Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,” Apr. 30,
2010, at 3; and by encouraging individuals with income to purchase health
insurance for themselves and their families. Covered individuals have the choice
to either purchase minimum essential coverage or pay a tax – promoting the
PPACA’s fiscal goals without requiring those who purchase coverage to pay twice.
1. In any challenge to a federal statute, “every reasonable construction
must be resorted to, in order to save a statute from unconstitutionality.” DeBartolo
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6Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988) (citation
omitted). This rule “recognizes that Congress … is bound by and swears an oath
to uphold the Constitution,” and that courts may “not lightly assume that Congress
intended to infringe constitutionally protected liberties or usurp power
constitutionally forbidden it.” Id. When the constitutionality of a congressional
act is questioned, “th[e] Court will first ascertain whether a construction of the
statute is fairly possible by which the question may be avoided.” Zadvydas v.
Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 689 (2001) (citation omitted).
Turning this principle on its head, Plaintiffs strain to give the law an
unconstitutional construction. Plaintiffs treat §5000A(a), the so-called “Individual
Mandate,” as a regulatory provision that, standing alone, cannot be an exercise of
the taxing power, then argue that the “penalty” provision, §5000A(b)(1), cannot be
construed as a tax because its purpose is to “forc[e] individuals to comply with the
Individual Mandate.” Brief of Appellants at 64-66.
The Supreme Court rejected this exact approach in New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992). The statute at issue there provided that the States
“shall be responsible for providing … for the disposal of … radioactive waste,” id.
at 169-70 (citation omitted), and was challenged as an impermissible “direct
command” on the States. The Court rejected the challenge, holding that the
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7“mandate” could not be analyzed on its own, but instead had to be read together
with subsequent sections creating “incentives” for compliance. So read, the
“mandate” afforded the States “choices,” rather than imposing an impermissible
“command.” Id.
The minimum coverage provision is no different. Its “mandate” must be
analyzed together with the tax-based mechanism through which Congress
encouraged minimum coverage. Properly viewed as a whole, the minimum
coverage provision is a valid taxing measure that affords individuals the choice of
either meeting a prescribed condition or paying a modest tax. See Thomas More
Law Center v. Obama, 2011 WL 2556039, at *30 (6th Cir. June 29, 2011) (Sutton,
J., concurring) (“TMLC”) (the PPACA “does not compel individuals to buy
insurance”).
2. Deference to a co-equal branch of government similarly requires that
a monetary exaction’s constitutionality be determined by its “practical impact, not
[its] name tag.” Jefferson Cty. v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423, 439-42 (1999) (ordinance
“declar[ing] it ‘unlawful … to engage in’ a covered occupation … without paying
[a] license fee” established “income tax”); see also Carmichael v. Southern Coal &
Coke Co., 301 U.S. 495, 508 (1937); Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Kansas, 216
U.S. 1, 27 (1910); License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. at 470-71. Courts must look past
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8“the formal language of the tax statute [to] its practical effect.” Complete Auto
Transit Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 275-79 (1977); see also In re Juvenile Shoe
Corp., 99 F.3d 898, 900 (8th Cir. 1996) (same).
In its practical operation, the minimum coverage provision is an income tax.
First, payment of the tax is conditioned upon receipt of income. See Acker,
527 U.S. at 437-39 (exaction is income tax for purposes of Buck Act if “‘levied on,
with respect to, or measured by, net income, gross income, or gross receipts’”)
(citing 4 U.S.C. §110(c)). Only individuals who receive income in excess of the
filing threshold are subject to the tax. 26 U.S.C. §5000A(e)(2).
Second, the amount paid is always a small fraction of a taxpayer’s annual
income.1 Thus, no sources of wealth other than income are taxed. Indeed, many
individuals with moderate incomes will be exempted from the tax. See, e.g., 26
U.S.C. §5000A(e)(1) (affordability exemption).
Third, the tax is “measured” as a percentage of income, subject to a floor
and ceiling (with both always far below total income), and remains an income tax
1 In 2016, for example, the payment by a taxpayer without coverage cannot be
greater than (1) 2.5% of household income above the filing threshold, or (2) a flat
dollar amount ranging from $695 to $2085, depending on family size. 26 U.S.C.
§5000A(c)(2)-(3). The tax will always be a small portion of total income under
either method.
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9notwithstanding its ceiling and floor. The Social Security tax is also capped, see
26 U.S.C. §3121(a)(1); 42 U.S.C. §430; and the “alternative minimum tax,” 26
U.S.C. §55, similarly ensures that taxpayers pay a minimum amount of federal
income tax.2
Fourth, the tax is collected entirely through the income tax system and its
self-reporting mechanisms. 26 U.S.C. §5000A(b)(2). Payments must be “assessed
and collected in the same manner as taxes,” and are included by law in “any
reference in [the Internal Revenue Code] to ‘tax.’” Id. §§5000A(g)(1), 6671(a).
The PPACA also treats family relationships in the same manner as the general
income tax code. Id. §5000A(b)(3) (individuals liable for payments required by
dependents or spouse); id. §5000A(c)(4) (household income and family size
defined by dependents reported on income tax return) (citing 26 U.S.C. §151).
These features further demonstrate that the minimum coverage provision operates
– and will be understood – as an income tax.3
2 In 2016, the payment will be calculated as a percentage of income for single
individuals with incomes from less than $40,000 to more than $200,000. This
range is calculated using 2010 filing thresholds and a conservatively estimated
average premium of $5,000 for individual coverage.
3 Plaintiffs assert that the minimum coverage provision cannot be an income tax
because income is not the sole factor that determines its applicability and amount.
Brief of Appellants at 64-65. This has never been the legal test. Indeed, many of
(continued)
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3. In the text of the PPACA, Congress made Commerce Clause findings
but did not invoke its taxing power. There is no requirement, however, that
Congress expressly invoke its taxing power, and the courts have never required
congressional “findings” regarding exercises of the taxing power. “[T]he
constitutionality of action taken by Congress does not depend on recitals of the
power which it undertakes to exercise.” Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S.
138, 144 (1948). The question is simply “whether Congress could have enacted the
legislation at issue pursuant to a constitutional provision granting it the power to
[act].” Crawford v. Davis, 109 F.3d 1281, 1283 (8th Cir. 1997). “As long as
Congress had such authority as an objective matter, whether it also had the specific
intent to legislate pursuant to that authority is irrelevant.” Id.
Moreover, the assertion here (relevant or not) that Congress had no intent to
tax is simply wrong. Congress expressly enacted the PPACA and the minimum
coverage provision for revenue purposes. See, e.g., PPACA, Pub. L. No. 111-148,
§1563(a)(1), 124 Stat. 119, 270 (2010) (“[T]his Act will reduce the Federal deficit
(continued)
the factors that determine the minimum coverage tax’s applicability and amount
also determine a taxpayer’s other income tax obligations. E.g., 26 U.S.C. §151
(income tax determined by number of people within taxpayer’s household). And,
because income taxes and other excise taxes are subject to the same constitutional
requirements, the minimum coverage provision is constitutional even if it is
construed as a form of excise tax other than an income tax.
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….”); Letter from CBO to Chairman Baucus (Sept. 16, 2009) (estimating revenues
generated by “penalty”); Joint Committee on Taxation, JCX-43-09 (Oct. 29, 2009)
(estimating revenue effects of “revenue provisions” including “Tax on Individual
Without Acceptable Health Care Coverage”). Congress may exercise its
regulatory and taxation powers simultaneously. See, e.g., McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil
Corp., 309 U.S. 414, 428 (1940) (finding import duty exercise of both taxing
power and power to regulate foreign commerce); Hampton, 276 U.S. at 412.
Indeed, many in Congress recognized the minimum coverage provision as a
tax. Proponents expressly invoked Congress’ taxing power. See, e.g., 155 Cong.
Rec. S13581 (Dec. 20, 2009) (Sen. Baucus); 155 Cong. Rec. S13751-52 (Dec. 22,
2009) (Sen. Leahy); 156 Cong. Rec. H1882 (Mar. 21, 2010) (Rep. Miller); 156
Cong. Rec. H1826 (Mar. 21, 2010) (Rep. Slaughter). Others described the
measure as a tax. See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 111-443, pt. 1, at 265 (2010) (discussing
“tax on individuals who opt not to purchase health insurance”); 156 Cong. Rec.
E506 (Mar. 21, 2010) (Rep. Waxman) (“The individual responsibility requirement
requires individuals to pay a tax on their individual tax filings ….”); 155 Cong.
Rec. S10877 (Oct. 29, 2009) (Sen. Hatch) (“Some may say this is simply a penalty
for not doing what Uncle Sam wants you to do, but let us face it, it is nothing more
than a new tax.”). And, the label “penalty” is consistent with Congress’ intent to
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tax: All taxes penalize, and throughout the legislative record, Congress used terms
like “tax,” “assessable payment,” “assessable penalty,” “tax penalty,” and
“penalty” interchangeably.4 Accordingly, no constitutional significance can be
attributed to Congress’ decision to replace “tax” with “penalty” in the final version
of the PPACA.
4. Notwithstanding these clear and undisputed legal principles, Plaintiffs
largely ignore the minimum coverage provision’s operation, and instead focus on
its label, insisting that the provision’s “penalty” label precludes a finding that the
assessment is a tax. Brief of Appellants at 66. The Eleventh Circuit committed
this same error, holding that the provision cannot be upheld as a tax because
4 See, e.g., Brief for Appellees at 53-54 (citing materials); 156 Cong. Rec. H1917
(Mar. 21, 2010) (Rep. Kirk) (“Among the new taxes is a new ‘Individual Mandate
Tax ….’”); 155 Cong. Rec. S12768 (Dec. 9, 2009) (Sen. Grassley) (“The …
individual mandate penalty …. can be called a penalty, but it is a tax.”); 155 Cong.
Rec. S11454 (Nov.18, 2009) (Sen. McCain) (“Taxes on individuals who fail to
maintain government-approved health insurance coverage will pay $4 billion in
new penalties ….”); 155 Cong. Rec. H12576 (Nov. 6, 2009) (Rep. Franks) (“It
would impose a 2.5 percent penalty tax on those who do not acquire healthcare
insurance.”); 155 Cong. Rec. S11143 (Nov. 5, 2009) (Sen. Johanns) (discussing
“penalty tax on individuals without insurance”); 155 Cong. Rec. S10746 (Oct. 27,
2009) (Sen. Enzi) (“Most young people will probably do the math and decide … I
can pay the $750-a year tax penalty rather than pay $5,000 a year more for health
insurance.”); 155 Cong. Rec. S8644 (Aug. 3, 2009) (Sen. Kyl) (“There would be a
penalty if they refused to [buy health insurance] that would go directly to their
income tax.”).
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Congress used the label “penalty.” See, e.g., Florida v. HHS, Nos. 11-11021, 11-
11067 (11th Cir. Aug. 12, 2011), at *186 (provision is “not ‘on its face’ a tax, but
rather a penalty”). Yet years of precedent teach that a monetary exaction’s
constitutionality is determined by its “practical effect,” rather than by its name tag,
and that “magic words or labels” cannot “disable an otherwise constitutional levy.”
Quill, 504 U.S. at 310 (citation omitted); Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 285 (rejecting
“rule[s] of draftsmanship” that “distract the courts and parties from their inquiry
into whether the challenged [provision] produced [unconstitutional] results”); Penn
Mut. Indem. Co. v. C.I.R., 277 F.2d 16, 20 (3d Cir. 1960) (“It is not necessary to
uphold the validity of [a] tax imposed by the United States that the tax itself bear
an accurate label”); In re Leckie Smokeless Coal Co., 99 F.3d 573, 583 (4th Cir.
1996) (“Leckie”) (Congress exercised taxing power in requiring mine operators to
pay insurance “premiums”).
Indeed, under unquestioned Supreme Court precedents dating back well over
a century, a monetary exaction may be an exercise of the taxing power even if
Congress gives it a label that is unambiguously regulatory. In 1866, the License
Tax Cases recognized that a fee imposed on gambling and liquor businesses was a
constitutional exercise of Congress’ taxing power even though Congress labeled
the fee a “license” and worded the “license” requirement as a prohibition on
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unlicensed activity, 72 U.S. at 468-69, 471; legislatures generally use “licenses” to
regulate, id. at 470-71; and the “license” requirement discouraged businesses
widely considered to be immoral, id. at 473. See also Acker, 527 U.S. at 439-42.
The result in License Tax Cases is irreconcilable with any argument that the
“penalty” label is determinative here. Indeed, “penalty” is far more consistent with
the characterization of an assessment as a tax than “license.” Congress explicitly
required that this “penalty” be construed as a tax for purposes of the Internal
Revenue Code, see 26 U.S.C. §§5000A(g)(1), 6671(a); and has long used the term
“penalty” when referring to taxes. E.g., Economic Growth and Tax Relief
Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107–16, §§301-303; 26 U.S.C. §1(f)
(repeatedly referring to the income-tax differential paid by certain married couples
as the “marriage penalty”). The use of “penalty” to describe a tax is also common
among courts, lawyers, and economists.5
5 E.g., Rousey v. Jacoway, 544 U.S. 320, 327 (2005) (describing tax on early
withdrawals from IRA accounts as “tax penalty”); United States v. Sotelo, 436 U.S.
268, 275 (1978) (funds labeled “penalty” by Congress retained “essential character
as taxes”); Hemingway v. United States, 81 F.Supp.2d 1163, 1164 (D. Utah 1999)
(describing tax on “golden parachute payments” as “tax penalty”); Dan Dhaliwal,
Oliver Zhen Li, Robert Trezevant, Is a Dividend Tax Penalty Incorporated into the
Return on a Firm’s Common Stock?, 35 Journal of Accounting and Economics 155
(2003).
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At all stages of the PPACA’s consideration, legislators referred to the
minimum coverage provision as a “tax” and used the terms “tax” and “penalty”
interchangeably. Supra Part I.3. To strike down major legislation because
Congress used the word “penalty” rather than “tax” would ignore the statute’s
actual operation, the understanding of Congress, the relevant precedent on the tax
authority, including License Tax Cases, and the Court’s duty to uphold statutes that
are, in substance, entirely constitutional.
5. It is similarly irrelevant whether Congress was in some sense
“motivated” by regulatory goals. Sozinsky, 300 U.S. at 513-14. Congress may
exercise its taxing power for regulatory purposes, including to deter or promote
particular activities. Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 44 (“[A] tax does not cease to be valid
merely because it regulates, discourages, or even definitely deters the activities
taxed.”); Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 782 (discussing “mixed-motive taxes that
governments impose both to deter a disfavored activity and to raise money”);
Hampton, 276 U.S. at 412 (“[O]ther motives in the selection of the subjects of
taxes cannot invalidate congressional action.”).
Indeed, a revenue raising measure can be a valid exercise of the taxing
power even if Congress’ primary purpose is regulatory. See, e.g., Sanchez, 340
U.S. at 44 (“[T]he revenue purpose of the tax may be secondary.”); Sipes v. United
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States, 321 F.2d 174, 176-77 (8th Cir. 1963) (same). Hampton, for example, held
that a protectionist tariff expressly enacted “to regulate the foreign commerce” was
a valid exercise of Congress’ taxing power. 276 U.S. at 401. The Court noted that
the first Congress imposed tariffs for protectionist purposes, and emphatically
rejected the argument “that it is unconstitutional to frame [monetary exactions]
with any other view than that of revenue raising.” Id. at 411-12. The text and
history here demonstrate that the minimum coverage provision was intended to,
and will, generate significant revenue. See supra Part I.3. That is enough.
Moreover, the revenue and regulatory purposes here are interrelated:
Congress’ goal of lessening the Treasury’s healthcare burden is served whether
individuals choose to pay the tax or purchase essential coverage. As the Supreme
Court recognized in upholding the similarly structured unemployment insurance
system, an exaction does not lose its character as a tax simply because it can be
avoided through an act that Congress wishes to encourage and that will itself
reduce the nation’s fiscal burden. Steward, 301 U.S. at 590-592.
As numerous cases – including Steward, Sanchez, and Hampton –
demonstrate, the Supreme Court has “abandoned” the Lochner-era “distinction[]
between regulatory and revenue-raising taxes.” Bob Jones Univ. v. Simon, 416
U.S. 725, 741 n.12 (1974). Exactions with regulatory purposes or effects that lack
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uniquely “penalizing” features remain taxes enacted pursuant to Congress’ taxing
authority. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 779.6
6. Tacitly admitting that more than the label “penalty” is needed,
Plaintiffs assert that the minimum coverage tax has punitive features, but the only
such feature they identify is the assessment itself. Brief of Appellants at 66. This
misses the point: As Kurth Ranch recognized, all taxes are punitive and
“oppressive” inasmuch as they “deter” the behaviors that are taxed, but more is
needed before a tax becomes a penalty. 511 U.S. at 778-79. There is no
“difference between being fined and being taxed a certain sum for doing a certain
thing” in the absence of “some further disadvantages.” Holmes, The Path of the
Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 461 (1897) (emphasis added). Many taxes discourage
(or induce) behavior that is subject to (or exempt from) the tax, but far more is
needed before the exaction ceases to be a tax. United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S.
22, 28 (1953) (wagering tax not penalty “regardless of its regulatory effect”);
6 Judge Sutton cited Kurth Ranch in claiming that the distinction “retains force
today.” TMLC at *20. Kurth Ranch, however, cautioned “against invalidating” a
monetary exaction because “oppressive or because the legislature’s motive was
somehow suspect,” for both taxes and penalties “deter certain behavior.” 511 U.S.
at 778-79 (emphasis added). Kurth Ranch simply recognized that “the extension of
the penalizing features” of a monetary exaction may eventually cause it to “lose[]
its character” as a tax. Id. at 779. The minimum coverage provision does not
operate in this manner, as we demonstrate immediately below.
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Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513 (1937) (“Every tax is in some
measure regulatory.”).
Although “the extension of [an exaction’s] penalizing features” may be so
substantial that “it loses its character” as a tax, Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 779, the
provision here exhibits no extended penalizing features at all. Indeed, no plaintiff
or court has ever pointed to any aspect of the financial obligations here imposed
that is in any way more punitive than that which is inherent in any tax obligation.
It is thus at the furthest remove from an exaction whose extraordinary penalizing
features preclude its treatment as a tax for constitutional purposes.
First, the minimum coverage provision gives taxpayers the option of
purchasing insurance or paying the tax. Had Congress intended to ensure
compliance with a regulatory “mandate,” it could have structured the “penalty” so
that payment would not relieve individuals of the underlying obligation. Cf.
United States v. Reorganized CF & I Fabricators of Utah, 518 U.S. 213, 225-226
(1996).
Second, the amount of the tax is at most the approximate equivalent of the
cost of insurance, not an excessively “high rate” “consistent with a punitive
character.” Cf. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 780 (punitive drug tax was eight times
drug’s market value). Congress’ non-punitive approach is evident in the modest
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overall amount of the tax, which is pro-rated if the taxpayer obtains insurance for
part of the tax year. See 26 U.S.C. §5000A(b); cf. Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co.,
259 U.S. 20, 36 (1922), entitled “The Child Labor Tax Case” (improper “penalty”
not pro-rated).
Third, payment of the tax is not conditioned on illegal conduct. Compare
Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 781-82 (conditioning tax on crime “is ‘significant of
penal and prohibitory intent rather than the gathering of revenue’”) (quoting United
States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 295 (1935)); with In re Juvenile Shoe Corp.,
99 F.3d at 902 (penalty for reversion of pension funds to employer was tax because
reversions not unlawful). One faces no consequence other than the tax for opting
not to purchase insurance, and the PPACA specifically bars the government from
resorting to criminal prosecution, penalties, liens, or levies for failure to pay the
tax. Id. §5000A(g)(2); Florida at *47 (“All the IRS, practically speaking, can do is
offset any tax refund owed to the uninsured taxpayer.”).7
7 That Congress took pains to make enforcement of the minimum coverage tax less
punitive than other taxes demonstrates that there has been no “extension of the
penalizing features” that might take the exaction outside of Congress’ taxing
authority. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. at 779. Nor does Congress’ reliance on less
intrusive collection measures undermine the conclusion that this is a tax. Acker,
527 U.S. at 440-41 (exaction was income tax where enforcement was limited to
suit for collection).
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Finally, the minimum coverage provision is located in the Internal Revenue
Code, collected through the tax system, and enforced by the tax authorities, further
evidencing an exercise of the taxing power. See Leckie, 99 F.3d at 583 n.12; cf.
Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 35 (noting that improper “penalty” was
enforced by Secretary of Labor).
In sum, the minimum coverage provision operates as an income tax and has
no uniquely “penalizing” features. It is an income tax for constitutional purposes.
II. The Minimum Coverage Provision Is Within Congress’ Plenary Power
To Tax Income
As an income tax, the minimum coverage provision is well within Congress’
taxing power. The Constitution affords Congress broad and comprehensive power
to tax, independent of the other enumerated congressional powers, and subject only
to narrow limitations. Pacific Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 433, 443-46
(1868); Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 174 (1796) (Chase, J.) (“A
general power is given to Congress, to lay and collect taxes, of every kind or
nature, without any restraint, except only on exports.”). Congress’ power to tax
income is especially broad. United States v. Safety Car Heating & Lighting Co.,
297 U.S. 88, 99 (1936) (“When it is [income], it may be taxed ….”).
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A. The Constitution’s Taxation Provisions
“The great object of the Constitution was, to give Congress a power to lay
taxes, adequate to the exigencies of government….” Hylton, 3 U.S. at 173.
“[N]othing is clearer … than the purpose to give this power to Congress, as to the
taxation of everything except exports, in its fullest extent.” Veazie Bank v. Fenno,
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533, 540 (1869). This “complete and all-embracing taxing
power” “is exhaustive and embraces every conceivable power of taxation.”
Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 12-13.
The power is subject to meaningful but narrow limitations, none of which
apply here.
1. Foremost, as explained above, while all constitutional taxes are
monetary “penalties,” not all monetary penalties are constitutional taxes. See
supra Part I.6. A legislative exaction’s penalizing features may take it outside
Congress’ taxing power. But the minimum coverage provision has no such
features. Id.
2. An exercise of Congress’ taxation power must produce “some
revenue.” Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 514; United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86, 94
(1919) (requiring “relation to the raising of revenue”). The minimum coverage
provision easily satisfies this requirement. The PPACA was prompted in part by
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Congress’ concern about the fiscal strain of rising healthcare costs, and the
minimum coverage provision will generate $4 billion in revenue, far exceeding the
revenue generated by other valid taxes. Cf. Kahriger, 345 U.S. at 28 n.4 (noting
valid taxes generating $3,501 and $28,911).
3. Congress must use its taxation power to promote the “general
welfare.” U.S. Const. art. I, §8. The scope of the “general welfare” “is quite
expansive.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90 (1976). The discretion to determine
whether a tax serves the general welfare “belongs to Congress, unless the choice is
clearly wrong, a display of arbitrary power, not an exercise of judgment.”
Helvering, 301 U.S. at 640.
The minimum coverage tax is part of a programmatic response to the
national problems caused by the number of Americans without adequate health
insurance. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §18091(a)(2). This readily satisfies the general
welfare requirement.
4. The Constitution imposes two additional limits on the means by which
Congress taxes: “direct taxes, including the capitation tax, shall be apportioned;
[and] duties, imposts, and excises shall be uniform.” Soule, 74 U.S. at 446.
Plaintiffs assert that the minimum coverage provision, if a tax, is a direct tax
requiring apportionment. Brief of Appellants at 64-65. This characterization is
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simply wrong, because payment of the tax is conditioned upon numerous factors.
Hylton, 3 U.S. at 175 (Chase, J.) (direct taxes are those imposed without regard to
“any other circumstance”) (emphasis added). But in any case, in taxing income
Congress acts with the specific authorization of the Sixteenth Amendment, which
gives Congress “power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source
derived, without apportionment ….” U.S. Const. amend. XVI (emphasis added).
The Amendment grants Congress plenary authority to tax any “accessions to
wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayers have complete dominion.”
C.I.R. v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955). Although Congress may
not use this power to pass taxes that plainly operate as property taxes, see Eisner v.
Macomber, 252 U.S. 189, 219 (1920), the Supreme Court has emphasized the
narrowness of this holding, Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 430-31, and recognized
that “income” should be construed liberally, see Merchants’ Loan & Trust Co. v.
Smietanka, 255 U.S. 509, 521 (1921).
Under the Sixteenth Amendment, income taxes, and other excise taxes, need
only be uniform. Brushaber, 240 U.S. at 18-19. A tax satisfies this requirement if
it exhibits no “undue preference” for certain states. United States v. Ptasynski, 462
U.S. 74, 86 (1983). The minimum coverage tax readily satisfies this test because it
applies the same non-discriminatory formula throughout the nation. See id. (tax
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exemption for “Alaskan oil” consistent with uniformity requirement because it
reflected “climactic and geographic conditions”).
5. Finally, an exercise of Congress’ plenary taxation power must not
offend the Constitution’s individual rights provisions, such as constitutional
prohibitions on double jeopardy or self-incrimination. See Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S.
767; Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968). There is no reasonable
argument that the minimum coverage provision offends any provision of the Bill of
Rights.
B. Contrary Arguments Rely Upon Discredited Restrictions On The
Taxing Power
Those challenging the PPACA’s constitutionality have relied on discredited
Lochner-era cases – specifically, Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20 (1922); and
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) – to contend that the PPACA’s
regulatory purpose takes it outside the scope of Congress’ taxing power. See also
TMLC at *17-*20 (discussing Child Labor Tax Case). This reliance is both
revealing and misplaced.
First, both cases involved exactions with numerous penalizing features,
absent here, demonstrating their overwhelmingly regulatory nature. This is the
point for which the two cases are occasionally cited. See, e.g., Kurth Ranch, 511 at
779; see also supra Part I.6 (noting that exaction at issue in Child Labor Tax Case
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was quite substantial, not pro-rated, and enforced by Labor Secretary); Steward,
301 U.S. at 590-93 (limiting Butler and Child Labor Tax Case to their facts).
Second, neither case can be reconciled with the many pre- and post-Lochner
era precedents establishing that federal taxes may be enacted for regulatory
purposes, see supra Part I.5 (discussing Hampton, Sanchez, and License Tax
Cases), including purposes and subjects outside Congress’ other enumerated
powers. “From the beginning of our government, the courts have sustained taxes
although imposed with the collateral intent of effecting ulterior ends which,
considered apart, were beyond the constitutional power of the lawmakers to realize
by legislation directly addressed to their accomplishment.” Sanchez, 340 U.S. at
45 (quotation omitted, emphasis added). Courts have long held that Congress may
impose conditional taxes or place conditions on the receipt of government funds to
achieve “objectives not thought to be within Article I’s enumerated legislative
fields.” South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (citation omitted)
(collecting cases); see also Regan v. Taxation Without Representation, 461 U.S.
540 (1983) (Congress cannot prohibit lobbying but can tax contributions to
organizations that lobby while exempting contributions to those that do not). Put
simply, the taxing power “reaches every subject.” License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. at
470-71.
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The contrary decisions in Butler and Child Labor Tax Case (and other
similar cases of that era) turned on the view that the Tenth Amendment bars
Congress from seeking to impact, directly or indirectly, areas of policy deemed
“matters of state concern” and thus “within power reserved to the States” – even
through otherwise valid exercises of its General Welfare Clause powers. Compare
Butler, 297 U.S. at 69-70; Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. at 36; with, e.g.,
Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340, 362 (1945) (“The Tenth Amendment does not
operate as a limitation upon the powers, express or implied, delegated to the
national government.”). That view is now thoroughly discredited: The Tenth
Amendment simply does not prohibit Congress from using its taxing and spending
power to create financial incentives for conduct that serves the general welfare.
New York, 505 U.S. at 166-67, 171-73.
C. The Minimum Coverage Provision Is Constitutionally
Indistinguishable From The Social Security Act
The Supreme Court has already directly rejected the claim that Child Labor
Tax Case and Butler prohibit Congress from exercising its taxing authority to
increase participation in insurance programs meeting minimum standards. From
the perspective of Congress’ taxation authority, the minimum coverage tax is no
different from the unemployment and old age insurance taxes Congress established
through the Social Security Act. See Helvering, 301 U.S. 619; Steward, 301 U.S.
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548. The constitutional propriety of that exercise of Congress’ taxation power is
beyond dispute; there is no substantive basis to treat this income tax any
differently.
1. The Social Security Act established comprehensive insurance
programs to address the financial insecurity stemming from economic
retrenchment and “old age.” Helvering, 301 U.S. at 641. To fund the “Federal
Old-Age Benefits,” Congress “la[id] two different types of tax, an ‘income tax on
employees,’ and ‘an excise tax on employers.’” Id. at 635-36. To promote the
development of unemployment insurance programs, Congress paired its tax on
employers with a credit for contributing to state insurance funds satisfying certain
criteria. Steward, 301 U.S. at 574.
In Helvering and Steward, the Supreme Court rejected constitutional
challenges to these provisions. Helvering rejected claims that the tax on employers
“was not an excise as excises were understood when the Constitution was adopted”
and that the Act was “an invasion of powers reserved by the Tenth Amendment to
the states or to the people.” 301 U.S. at 638. Steward rejected the argument that
Congress’ tax and credit system was a regulatory mandate on employers to make
particular insurance contributions and on states to create particular programs, such
that the “so-called tax was not a true one.” 301 U.S. at 592. Steward instead
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concluded that the conditional tax credit was a reasonable way to structure a tax, as
it “promoted … relief through local units” while “in all fairness” ensuring that
employers making contributions that helped alleviate the problem would not “pay a
second time.” Id. at 589.
Taxpayers have continued to resist payment of the taxes by complaining
(like opponents of the PPACA) that Congress cannot use its taxing power to
establish “compulsory benefits” that they do not want or will not use. Those
claims have been universally rejected. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252
(1982); Carmichael, 301 U.S. at 521, 525 (“It is irrelevant … that some pay the tax
who have not occasioned its expenditure, or that in the course of the use of its
proceeds … the legislature has benefited individuals, who may or may not be
related to those who are taxed.”).
2. Instead of mandating participation in a single national insurance
program, or taxing everyone and then providing a credit to those with insurance,
the PPACA gives taxpayers the choice of purchasing adequate insurance or paying
a tax. This approach generates revenue and provides an incentive for taxpayers to
purchase health insurance, while imposing no additional obligations upon those
who have purchased coverage.
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This minor difference from the Social Security Act in form does not render
the PPACA’s conditional tax unconstitutional. Payment of the minimum coverage
tax is, as in Steward, “dependent upon the conduct of the taxpayers.” 301 U.S. at
591. Steward established that Congress may use its taxing power to stimulate
activity, including the purchase of insurance, where the failure to act contributes to
a costly national problem. Id. Steward recognized that many states, to avoid
occupying “a position of economic disadvantage as compared with neighbors or
competitors,” would not independently enact unemployment compensation
programs. Id. at 588. The Social Security Act addressed this problem through a
tax that generated revenues “used and needed by the nation as long as states [were]
unwilling … to do what can be done at home,” while “crediting the taxpayer … to
the extent that his contributions [to a state program] … simplified or diminished
the problem of relief and the probable demand upon the resources of the fisc.” Id.
at 588-89.
The minimum coverage provision is indistinguishable, in substance and
effect, from the conditional tax in Steward. Providing healthcare to the uninsured
imposes an immense burden on the state and federal fiscs. E.g., H.R. Rep. No.
111-443, pt. 2, at 983 (2010) (“In 2008, total government spending to reimburse
uncompensated care costs … was approximately $42.9 billion.”). Most states have
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not gone beyond providing care to the indigent, children, and elderly – leaving
many Americans with no health coverage. Meanwhile, employer-provided health
benefits are declining because of the rising costs of healthcare. High Healthcare
Costs: A State Perspective: Hearing Before S. Comm. On Finance, 110th Cong. S2
(2008) (Sarah Collins, The Commonwealth Fund). Many individuals who wish to
purchase insurance cannot do so. 155 Cong. Rec. S13568-69 (Dec. 20, 2009) (Sen.
Baucus). Now, as in 1935, Congress has “many reasons – fiscal and economic as
well as social and moral – for planning to mitigate disasters that bring these
burdens in their train.” Steward, 301 U.S. at 587.
The PPACA addresses the obstacles to comprehensive health insurance
coverage, in part by barring practices (such as denying coverage for pre-existing
conditions) that make affordable coverage unavailable to many, and in part by
providing tax incentives for individuals to purchase insurance. Here, no less than
with Social Security, “[t]he purpose of [Congress’] intervention … is to safeguard
its own treasury and as an incident to that protection to place the [taxpayers] upon
a footing of equal opportunity. Drains upon its own resources are to be checked;
obstructions to the freedom of the [taxpayers] are to be leveled.” Id. at 590-91. By
giving taxpayers the choice to purchase insurance or pay a tax that is at most the
“approximate equivalent[],” id. at 591, the minimum coverage provision is
Appellate Case: 11-1973     Page: 40      Date Filed: 08/19/2011 Entry ID: 3820278
31
designed, like the Social Security Act, to prevent taxpayers who have otherwise
paid for coverage from having “to pay a second time.” Id. at 589.
It is meaningless formalism to argue that Congress could have passed the
minimum coverage provision as an increased income tax on all taxpayers
accompanied by a credit for those with qualifying health insurance, but that it
could not adopt the more direct course of a conditional tax imposing the same net
cost. See, e.g., TMLC at *17-*18. The Supreme Court has explicitly rejected this
approach to a tax’s constitutionality. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 288
(“[F]ormalism merely obscures the question whether the tax produces a forbidden
effect.”). Both methods afford the taxpayer the same choice with the same net tax
effect. See United States v. New York, 315 U.S. 510, 517 (1942).
The Constitution gives Congress the “useful and necessary right … to select
… means” “which, in its judgment, would most advantageously effect the object to
be accomplished.” McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 419 (1819). Here, the
means Congress chose – directly imposing an income tax upon those who have not
purchased health insurance – is simpler and less administratively onerous than a
functionally identical tax and credit system, especially since the majority of
income earners already have health coverage. Nothing in the Constitution requires
Congress to refrain from using the most efficient means to accomplish its
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permitted ends. See id. at 421 (Congress may use all “appropriate” and “plainly
adapted” means).
In substance and effect the minimum coverage provision is an income tax
well within Congress’ enumerated powers. Matters of mere form cannot render
unconstitutional this proper exercise of the taxation power.
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the dismissal of Plaintiffs’ case.
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